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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

ORLO S. MA,V, R. JOHN MAW,
and VADEL T. MA,V,

Plaintiffs and Appellants,
No.
10823

vs.
YVEBER BASIN 'VATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an action brought to recover the fair market
value of shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck Club
which were terminated as a result of the construction
of the 'Villard Bay Reservoir.
1

DISPOSITION IN LO,VER COURT

This case now appears for the second time before
this Court. On the first appeal this Court reversed the
Judgment of the Second District Court whereby the
plaintiffs' Complaint had been dismissed with preju. '
dice because the District Court concluded that a 1936
"Right-of-'Vay Agreement" was not ambiguous on
its face, and that certain duck club shooting privileges
provided for in that agreement were only for the benefit of the named sons of Annie C. Maw, who was one
of the parties to the 1936 agreement ( 15 Utah 2d 271,
391P.2d300).
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Upon remand, and at the final Pre-Trial hearing,
the Second District Court ordered that the prayer for
punitive damages set forth in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint be stricken.
At the trial of this matter on November 29 and
30, 1966, the Court ruled that plaintiffs' issue that a
third-party beneficiary contract existed be taken from
the jury as a matter of law and further, that the interpretative issue as to whether the 1936 Right-of-Way
Agreement extended beyond the deaths of the four
named sons of Annie C. Maw be likewise taken from
the jury as a matter of law.
Respective counsel stipulated (plaintiffs' counsel
retaining his conditional objection to the Court's failure
to submit to the jury the interpretative issue as to
whether the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement extended
beyond the deaths of the four sons of Annie C. Maw)
2

that the value of the shooting privileges would be submitted to the jury as to George C. Maw only, and
that if any of the other plaintiffs were entitled to judgment a separate computation would thereafter be made,
based upon the value of such shooting privileges to
George C. Maw, by computing the life expectancies
of such other plaintiffs and their respective age or ages
as of April 7, 1958 (R. 28 & 38).
Thereafter the jury returned a verdict of $2,040.00
for the plaintiff George C. Maw and against the defendant 'Veber Basin 'Vater Conservancy District.
At a subsequent hearing the Court announced its
final ruling that judgment would be awarded only as
to plaintiff George C. Maw, and that it would deny
recovery to each and all of the other plaintiffs. George
C. Maw does not appeal since his action has been resolved and settled.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of the applicable rulings
and orders entered in this action, and request that they
be permitted to submit the issues-of punitive damage,
third party beneficiary contract and interpretation of
the 1936 Right-of-Way Agr.eement as to appellantsto a jury for determination.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The relevant facts begin in 1936, at which time a
widow by the name of Annie C. Maw and her four sons
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lived in the farming community of Plain City, \Y eber
County. :Mrs ..l\1aw and her four sons owned and op.
erated in excess of 1,000 acres of farming and grazing
land in the area north of Plain City, being partly in
\Veber County and partly in Box Elder County. Tht
particular grazing lands extended westerly into the
marsh lands of the Great Salt Lake, where individuals
from the city of Ogden had organized a club for the
purpose of shooting ducks.
This club, known as the Ogden Duck Club, recognized that in order to utilize lands which it had under
lease from the State of Utah, it would be well to secure
from Mrs. Maw a written right-of-way so as to insure
continued passage in the future across her lands in going
to and from their clubhouse and duck hunting area.
No other route was available. Accordingly, the Ogden
Duck Club had its attorneys prepare a Right-of-\Vay
Agreement providing for such passage and other rights.
The 1936 Right-of-Way Agrement is set forth in its
entirety in the Appendix of this brief.
Mrs. Maw apparently made a bargain which proved
to be very advantageous to her entire family. Not only
were the shooting privileges enjoyed by her family
non-assessable in that they were not required to pay
the annual dues of the club, but it developed that the
members of the Maw family were soon in social and
business contact with the most elite professional and
business leaders of th eOgden area. Their personal contacts with Club members, together with the use of boats,
clubhouse facilities, blinds and leased hunting grounds,
4

all contributed to making the shooting privileges rather
raluable.
1

1

In the course of time three of the sons of Annie
C. ~law died, leaving at the time when the complaint
was filed one son, George C. Maw, surviving. However,
upon the death of the other three named sons, at least
one of the sons of each was substituted in place of the
respective fathers ( R. 39-pp. 8, 20 & 25). These
grandsons of Annie C. l\1aw similarly used the duck
club facilities and continued to shoot ducks and otherwise partake of the club's facilities in place of their
fathers. The appellants here, Orlo S. Maw, R. John
~law and Vadel T. Maw, are the respective sons of
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus Maw and Gilbert E. Maw,
three of the four sons of Annie C. Maw. The affected
parties hereto construed the 1936 agreement as permitting them to continue to use the facilities which their
fathers had previously enjoyed.
In about 1956, the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, in conjunction with the United States
Bureau of Reclamation, decided to construct a water
storage reservoir to be known as the Willard Bay Reservoir. This particular reservoir was planned to cover
a substantial portion of the Maw land holdings and
a portion of the leased grounds where the duck club
had its clubhouse and shooting area. The road which
the Ogden Duck Club had been using through the Maw
properties was included in the land to be inundated.
In effectuating its planned construction the 'Veber
Basin 'Vater Conservancy District arranged to physic-
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ally move the duck club improvements about one mile
west from their previous location. Also notified of the
planned construction were Grace B. Maw and W.
J olm .Maw and Sons, Inc., successors in interest to
Annie C. Maw.
"\Vhen the "\V eber Basin 'i\T ater Conservancy District and the United States Bureau of Reclamation were
ready to purchase the lands for the Willard Bay project, several members of each organization contacted
Mr. Orlo ~law, one of the appellants, who was also at
that time the president of W. John Maw and Sons, Inc.,
for the purchase of the properties needed for the project
(R. 39-pp. 7 & 8). Orlo Maw informed the various
individuals that his company would not consider selling
the lands involved unless his uncle George, himself,
and his cousins were proteced as to their shooting privi·
leges in the Ogden Duck Club, either in that they would
be paid for the privileges or that the privileges would
not be disturbed in any way (R. 39-p. 7).
Pursuant to the demands of Orlo Maw that the
shooting rights of the Maw family be protected prior
to the signing of any land purchase contract, Mr. E. J.
Skeen, attorney for the respondent, prepared a rough
draft of a letter dated July 5, I957 (R. 39-p. 10; PL
Exh. B). Subsequently, five copies of the final draft
of this same letter, all under the signature of E. J.
Fjeldsted, Manager of the Weber Basin Water Con·
servancy District, were received by Orlo Maw for
distribution to the members of the Maw family whose
rights were involved (R. 39-pp. II & I2). This letter
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(Pl. Exh. C) made specific reference to the exclusion
of the duck club shooting privileges from the proposed
]and purchase contract in the following language:
\VEBER BASIN DATER CONSERVANCY
DISTRICT
506 Kiesel Building

Ogden, Utah

July 5, 1957

W. John Maw and Sons, Inc.
Plain City
Utah
Gentlemen:
Tract Nos. 95, 104, and 106
Willard Dam and Reservoir
,V. JOHN MAW AND SONS, INC.
It is our understanding that you have executed a
contract for the sale to the United States of tract Nos.
95, 104 and 106, 'Villard Dam and Reservoir.

This letter will assure you that the land purchase
contract does not cover your other property interests in
the 'Villard Bay Area, and specifically your state leases,
water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting
privileges, or lands other than those described in the
land purchase contract. Any such property interests
which will be required in the construction of the Dam
or which will be damaged or destroyed will be appraised
at a later date and an offer to purchase will be made.
Yours very truly,
s/d E. J. FJELDSTED
E. J. FJELDSTED
Manager
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After receiving the written assurance above referred
to, on July 15, 1957, Orio ~law executed a Land Pur. '
chase Contract (Pl. Exh. D) with the United State~
of America for the purchase of the properties ( R. 39_
p. 13), wherein it was stated among other things that
the right-of-way which gave the Maws claim to the duck
club shooting privileges would not be included in the
contract. Its terms provided as follows:
1

1

"3a It is understood and agreed that the rights
to be conveyed to the United States ... shall be
free from lien or encumbrance except . . . and
(ii) rights-of-way: for roads (including the
right-of-way granted to the Ogden Duck Club
across Tract 95) ... "
Pursuant to the Land Purchase Contract, Grace
B. Maw and W. John .Maw and Sons, Inc., executed
a Warranty Deed (Pl. Exh. E) to the United States
of America. That Warranty Deed, which was prepared
by the grantee, was absolute on its face and made no
reservation for the duck club right-of-way.
For nearly a year thereafter the matter rested
quietly until members of the Maw family began to
demand that arrangements be made to protect their
hunting privileges or that they be paid for them (R.
39-p. 15). George C. Maw contacted Mr. J. Stuart
McMaster, Field Solicitor of the United States Department of Interior, regarding the shooting privileges
which were to be appraised and purchased (R. 39p. 17). In response to his inquiry George C. Maw re·
ceived from J. Stuart McMaster the following letter
(PL Exh. F):
8

UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR
410 Newhouse Building

IO Exchange Place
Salt Lake City II, Utah

September II, 1958
l\Ir. George C. Maw
Roy, Utah
Dear Mr. Maw:
Thank you for your letter of September 9, 1958
regarding the Ogden Duck Club.
You are advised that the matter has not been finally
determined, but we are working on it. Please advise me
if it would be possible for us to meet at a convenient
time with the Maw people who are interested in the
hunting privileges.
I would appreciate hearing from you at your earliest convenience.
Very truly yours,
s/d J. Stuart McMaster
J. STUART McMASTER
Field Solicitor
Copy to: Reg. Dir., BR, SLCU, attn: 4-400
Project Manager, BR, Ogden, Utah
In the meantime, and before court action was commenced, the Weber Basin District undertook construction activities, obliterated the old right-of-way which
the Ogden Duck Club had been using, and created a
new roadway over other portions of what had been the
9

.Maw properties, and which it had acquired. The Ogden
Duck Club thereupon notified the l\Iaws that their duck
club privileges had terminated.
It later developed in the deposition of Mr. Eubank
'
secretary of the Ogden Duck Club, and after litigation
had commenced, that the notice given to the Maws
of the termination of their rights was given after the
Ogden Duck Club had executed a Quit Claim Deed
to the l\Iaws to various lands in the area, which included
the right-of-way reserved in the Land Purchase Contract with the United States but not reserved in the
Warranty Deed from the Maws to the United States
(Eubank Deposition P. 51). W. John Maw and Sons,
Inc., and Grace B. Maw were made grantees of the
particular Quit Claim Deed, without their consent or
knowledge and without any prior discussion (Eubank
Deposition p. 59). In fact, the Maw family obtained
knowledge of the Quit Claim Deed quite some time
after it had been executed and recorded at the request
of the 'Veber Basin Water Conservancy District and
court proceedings were in process. The deed was never
accepted by the Maw family (Record on Appeal No.
9950-pp. 19 & 20).
This lawsuit arose when plaintiffs were refused
payment for the value of their duck club shooting privi·
leges and the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District refused to exercise its power of eminent domain
to acquire the property interests held by the Maws.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE INTERPRETATIVE ISSUE AS TO
WHETHER THE 1936 RIGHT - OF - \VAY
AGREE~IENT EXTENDED BEYOND THE
DEATHS OF THE FOUR SONS OF ANNIE
C. :\IA\V SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A ~IATTER
OF LAvV IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS.
POINT II
THE ISSUE AS TO \VHETHER A THIRDP ARTY BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT EXISTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF PLAINTIFFS SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A :MATTER
OF LAW IN FAVOR OF SAID PLAINTIFFS.
POINT III
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST
THE WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S FRAUDULENT, UNLAWFUL AND
MALICIOUS TRESPASS UPON, AND DESTRUCTION OF, THEIR PR 0 PERT Y
RIGHTS.
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POINT I
THE INTERPRETATIVE ISSUE AS TO
WHETHER THE 1936 RIGHT-OF- 'VAY
AGREE.MENT EXTENDED BEYOND THE II
DEATHS OF THE FOUR SONS OF ANNIE
C. l\'IA 'V SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUBMITTED 1
TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A MATTER II
OF LAW IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFFS.
\
I

J

Upon the prior appeal of this identical case, this \
Court reversed the Second District Court in its inter- !
1
pretation of the 1936 Right-ofWay Agreement. In
its opinion of April 17, 1964, this Court affirmatively
and directly held that the conclusion of the lower court,
to the effect that the shooting privileges were only for
the benefit of the four sons of Annie C. Maw, was
untenable as a matter of law (No. 9950-15 Utah 2d i
271, 391 P. 2d 300).

I

The written opinion of this Court on the prior
appeal recites three conclusions of the district court.
These three conclusions are ( R. 2-p. 2) :

I

I

I. That the 1936 "Right-of-Way Agreement"
was not ambiguous on its face, and that the \
shooting privileges were only for the benefit of
the named sons of Annie C. Maw.

2. Both parties (Ogden Duck Club and Weber
Basin ':V ater Conservancy District) were excused from performance under the contract.
3. That the ':V eber Basin Water Conservancy
District was not liable to any of the appellants
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either by way of agreement, estoppel or otherwise for loss of shooting privileges.
,

.I

I
I
1

I

I

In commenting on the district court's conclusions,
this Court said (R. 2-p. 2):
""Te agree with the court's conclusion that the
Duck Club is not responsible for breach of contract." (Giving reasons) .

*

*

*

"However, we cannot agree with the other conclusions of the court. As shown above, the Duck
Club was granted a convenient right of way for
access to its clubhouse and shooting grounds over
Annie C. Maw's lands for so long as it maintained its clubhouse and shooting grounds for
the purpose of shooting wild fowl. This right
of access was to be exclusive for the use of the
Club and its members, except that Annie C.
Maw and her successors in interest were obligated to keep a portion of this right-of-way in
a travelable condition, for which service the sons
of Annie C. l_\,faw named therein were granted
certain nonassessible shooting privileges, which
privileges any such named son could in any year
designated a son of his own to enjoy such privilege in his stead." (Emphasis added).
At the subsequent trial of this matter the district
court seemingly ignored the mandate of this Court.
Again, the district court refused to permit the jury
to make findings for the purpose of interpreting the
1936 Rightof-Way Agreement in light of the evidence
adduced at trial. In fact, the district court took the issue
from the jury after commenting that " ... there's only
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one side testifying to this pretty much" ( R. 39-p.
57b). Nevertheless, the court ruled a,gainst that one
side testifying as to the interpretation of the Right-of.
'Vay Agreement (R. 38).
The aforementioned rulings of the district court
came about when the court ref used to submit Plaintiffs'
Requested Special Interrogatories to the Jury (R. 23).
Plaintiffs' interrogatory number one asked:
I. Did the acts and conduct of the Maw family
and the Ogden Duck Club after the deaths o.f
Wilmer J. Maw, Rufus Maw and Gilbert Maw
continue the 1936 agreement duck hunting provisions to sons of the three deceased brothers?

Answer·----------------------·-···
("Yes" or "no"\

1

In discussing this particular interrogatory the fol- '
lowing conversation took place (R. 39-p. 57a):
THE COURT: And your question number

I was that estoppel idea?

MR. FULLER: No. That was party the
estoppel, but mainly the interpretation of the
'36 agrement placed upon it by the acts and conduct of the parties. It's an interpretative questionTHE COURT (interposing) Let's see. The
'36 agreement was between the Maws and the
Duck Club.
MR. SKEEN: It was between Annie Maw
and the Duck Club.
THE COURT: Yes. And you want a little
activity here to interpret the contract?
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1\-IR. I<,ULLER:
Honor.

That

is

correct,

Your

THE COURT: 'Vell, let me state it this way,
though. Is there any conflict of evidence for the
jury to find anyway?
lVIR. FULLER:
conflict.

I don't think there's any

THE COURT: Or just for the court?
.MR. SKEEN: I don't think, if the court
please, that there's any evidence that would justify conduct as construing an agreement. And
we have had evidence that certain members of
the Maw family hunted there, butTHE COURT: (interposing) But it wouldn't
be a question for the jury by this conduct.
MR. SKEEN: That's right: I think it's purely
a question for the court.
MR. FULLER: 'Vell, the point we raised
there was one of fact. If they were toTHE COURT (interposing) 'Vell, there's
only one side testifying to this pretty much.
MR. FULLER: That's right.
THE COURT: And so we wouldn't give it
to the .fury anyway unless there was a conflict
of facts.
MR. FULLER: Well, we don't care on that
,just so long as it's well understood that there's
no conflict and the answer to that is yes, so that
the court can take it from there.
MR. SKEEN: Well, of course, we think the
answer would be no.
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MR. FULLER: Then we think it should go '

I

to the jury.

.Mr. SKEEN: I don't think it should go to ·
the jury, Your Honor, because I think it's asking the jury to considerTHE COURT: (interposing) Well, after
each of theseMR. SKEEN: (continuing) interpreting the
contract which is purely a matter for the court.
And I think the evidence is very clear that any
conduct that might have stemmed from courtesy
shooting or anything else, there isn't any showing thatTHE COURT: (interposing) Well, that's
true of course.
MR. SKEEN: And I think it's a question of
interpretation, and I think the job on that is
Your Honor's.
As can be seen from the above question, it was the
defendant's contention that " ... interpreting the contract ... is purely a matter for the court ... " (R. 39
-p. 58b). With this contention the court apparently
agreed by saying:

"Well, that's true of course." (R. 39-p. 57c).
The interpretative issue was then taken from the jury
as a matter of law (R. 39-p. 57).
The respective functions of the judge and jury
with regard to questions of law and fact are so elemental as to warrant only brief discussion. In 53 Am.
Jur., Trial, Sec. 266 (1945), the general rule is stated:

16

"\Vhere a contract is to be construed by its
terms alone, it is the duty of the court to interpret it; but where its meaning is obscure, and its
construction depends upon other and extrinsic
facts in connection with what is written, the question of interpretation should be submitted to the
jury, under proper instructions."
Again in 53 Am. J ur., Trial, Sec. 270 ( 1945), we
read:
"Even though a written contract is ambiguous
and extrinsic evidence on the matter of intention
has been introduced, it is still within the province
of the court to construe the writing where the
extraneous matter is undisputed and unambiguous. It is only where the extrinsic evidence is
unconceded, conflicting, ambiguous, or such that
a reasonable man might draw different inferences therefrom that such evidence, with the
written contract, should be submitted to the jury.
But where the contract is not clear or is ambiguous, and, even though the evidence is not
conflicting, different reasonable conclusions are
possible, the question is one for the jury."
How the trial court can take an agreement which
has been declared ambiguous by this Court, hear testimony as to the course of performance of that agreement which is adduced pretty much by one side (appellants), and then direct a verdict for the respondent is
difficult to see. There can be no question that the court
could have lllore appropriately directed a verdict on
the particular issue in favor ?f the appellants who testified at length as to the course of performance or
practical construction of the agreement.
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A look at the Partial Transcript of Proceedings
will give credence to the court's comment that the ap.
pellants adduced substantially all of the evidence before
the court on the interpretation of the 1936 Right-of. ,
Way Agreement. All three appellants in this action 'i
testified to the fact that the sons of the four sons of
Annie C. Maw had used the facilities of the Ogden
Duck Club subsequent to the deaths of their respecfae
fathers, who were the sons of Annie C. Maw .
1

.Mr. Orlo S. Maw, who was not even cross-examined,
testified as fallows:
Q. Now coming back to the time of your father's
passing in 1953, did any member of your
family-By that I mean, did you or any
brother that you might have-continue to
use any of these shooting rights and privi·
leges in the Duck Club?

A. My older brother went out on the lake and
shot ducks.

I
~

I

Orlo's cousin, R. John Maw, testified as follows I
(R. 39-pp. 20 & 21):
Q. Mr. Maw, who was your father?

A. Rufus Maw.

Q. Rufus Maw. And will you tell us when he
pased away?
A. 1949.

*

*

*

Q. And over the years and up until 1957 or '58,
could you tell us generally the extent of the
hunting that you did each year on their club
facilities?
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A. Oh, I think six or eight times a year probably.
Q. And during the heaviest hunting-shooting
portion of the season, how often would vou
go out to hunt on the facilities?
·

A. '"'ell, I always tried to go once a week and
twice if I could probably.
Q. During the time that you were exercising this
hunting activity, did you ever hunt with the
regular members of the club?

A. You mean go out in the boat with them?

Q. Yes, that is what I mean. Did you use the
facilities with them?
A. (witness nods head up and down).

Q. Could you tell us approximately when the
hunting rights as to yourself terminated?
A. \Vell, in '57 or '58.
Another cousin, V ad el T. Maw, also testified that
he used the facilities of the Ogden Duck Club both
before and after the death of his father, Gilbert E.
Maw, in 1954 (R. 39-p. 24). In referring to his father
the testimony went as follows (R. 39-p. 25):

Q. From the time he was first hospitalized and
up to and including the year 1957, did you
have occasion to use the Duck Club facilities
for hunting purposes?
A. I did.

Q. Could you tell us generally from the time he
was hospitalized how often you used those
facilities?

19

A. Oh, approximately once a week.
Q. 'Vould this be every year or alternating years
or what kind of pattern?
'

A. As far as I remember, I went out every year,
yes.
Q. And during a season, approximately how
often did you use those facilities?

A. 'Vell, once to twice a week. I went twice if
it was possible.
It is important to note at this point that this approved use of the club facilities subsequent to the deaths
of the sons of Annie C. Maw transpired before any
controversy had arisen. Furthermore, this practical
construction continued for a period of some nine years
after the death of Rufus Maw.

Respondent in this action would have us believe
that the use of the duck club facilities by the grandsons of Annie C. Maw was merely a gratuity or that
it was associated with the work that some members of
the Maw family did for the Ogden Duck Club. How·
ever, the testimony of Vadel T. Maw makes it abun·
dantly clear that any additional privileges which he
or his brother might have had by reason of employment
existed prior to his father's death (R. 39-p. 28).
Q. Now during the time that you and your
brother worked before the Ogden Duck Club,
this was subsequent to your father's death or
before his death?

A. It would be before his death.
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The respondent should not be heard at this point,
after the controversy has arisen, to declare that all
privileges were a mere gratuity. This declaration on
the part of the respondent should not be allowed to
prevail over the practical construction made by the
appellants hereto at a point of time prior to the start
of this controversy. Furthermore, the members of the
Ogden Duck Club had full knowledge of the use of their
facilities by the grandsons of Annie C. Maw (Record
on Appeal No. 9950-R. 72-p. 40). This use was
obviously acquiesced in by the Duck Club (R. 39P· 38). That the Ogden Duck Club acknowledg-ed an
obligation to members of the l\!Iaw family is made obvious by Mr. Eubank, secretary of the Ogden Duck
Club, in his reference to the Quit Claim Deed (Eubank
Deposition p. 60) :
Q. That then was the basis for your termination
of their privileges in the Club?
A. That is correct . . .
At this point it must be made clear that the appellants do not contend that the practical construction
herein sought was placed on the agreement by only the
parties of one side; instead, there was a mutual and
identical interpretation. This mutual interpretation is
evidenced by the testimony of Mr. Eubank, and by
correspondence received by the Maws from the defendant. Mr. Eubank recognized the existence of the rights
of the Maws up to the time the Quit Claim Deed was
executed (Eubank Deposition p. 54) and he also
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admitted that grandsons of Annie C. Maw used the
duck shooting facilities after their fathers died with 1
full concurrence of the Duck Club (Record on Appeal
No. 9950-R. 72-p. 40). The letters from Mr. Fjeldsted I
(Pl. Exh. C) made no reference to the shooting privi. I
leges being held by only George C. Maw (the one sur- I
viving son) ; rather, five executed letters were delivered
to Orlo Maw for distribution to the members of the I
.Maw family who claimed duck shooting rights (R. 39 \
-p. 12). Further, the McMaster letter (Pl. Exh. F) I
referred to " ... the Maw people who are interested
in the hunting privileges." It further stated:
1
1

1

"We are interested in determining whether or
not all of them are interested in retaining such
hunting privileges."
This interpretation of a contract by agreement by
its course of performance of practical construction has
been sanctioned by this Court in a substantial number
of cases. However, the general rule is that the interpretation of a contract cannot be aided with evidence
from extraneous sources unless there is ambiguity or
uncertainty. This is made clear in Ephriam Theatre
Company v. Hawk, 7 Utah 2d 163, 321 P. 2d 221, 223
(1958), where this Court said:
"In considering the controversy here it is well
to keep in mind the fundamental concepts in
regard to contracts that their purpose is to re·
duce to writing the conditions upon which the
minds of the parties have met and to fix their
rights and duties in respect t~ereto. _The i~te~t
so expressed is to be found, 1f possible, w1thm
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the four corners of the instrument itself in accordance with the ordinary accepted meaning
of the words used. Unless there is ambiguity or
uncertainty in the language so that the meaning
is confused, or is susceptible of more than one
meaning, there is no justification for interpretation or explanation from extraneous sources."
In light of the decision of this Court on the prior
appeal, which decision held the 1936 Right-of-"\Vay
Agreement to be ambiguous, it would seem that the
circumstances of this case are appropriate for interpretation by extraneous evidence as to the course of performance or practical construction. Nevertheless, this
Court has limited the rule of the Ephraim Theatre case
by allowing evidence as to the course of performance
to be used in establishing rights under an agreement
which was not ambiguous. Under this latter rule, which
was laid down in Bullough v. Sims, 16 Utah 2d 304,
400 P. 2d 20 ( 1965) , there can be no doubt that the
trial court should have allowed the jury to interpret
the 1936 Agreement with the aid of the extraneous
evidence introduced at trial. In the Bullough case this
Court quoted the California Supreme Court at length
on page 308:
"This rule of practical construction is predi..:ated on the common seense concept that 'actions
speak louder than words'. Words are frequently
but an imperfect medium to convey thought and
intention. "\Vhen the parties to a contract perform under it and demonstrate by their conduct
that they knew what they were talking about
the courts should enforce their interest.
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"Appellants correctly claim that this doctrine
of practical construction can only be applied
when the contract is ambiguous, and cannot be
used when the contract is unambiguous. That is
undoubtedly a correct general statement of the
law (citations omitted). But the question in.
volved in such cases is ambiguous to whom~
Words frequently mean different things to dif.
fent people. Here the contracting parties demonstrated by their actions that they knew what
the words meant and were intended to mean.
Thus, even if it be assumed that the words standing alone might mean one thing to the members
of this court, where the parties have demonstrated by their actions and performance that to them
the contract meant something quite different,
the meaning and intent of the parties should be
enforced. In such a situation the parties by their
actions have created the 'ambiguity' required to
bring the rule into operation. If this were not
the rule the courts would be enforcing one contract when both parties have demonstrated that
they meant and intended the contract to be quite
different."
This Court has also spoken as to the nature of
the facts necessary and sufficient to warrant a practical
construction. In this regard this Court allows a unilateral construction or a mutual construction, while
naturally favoring the latter. This Court's specific view
is to be found in Hodges Irr. Co. v. Swan Creek Canal
Co., I l l Utah 405, 181 P. 2d 217, 220 (1947), wher~
this Court quoted with approval from 17 C.J.S., Contracts, Sec. 325, as follows:
"To warrant the court in according great
weight to, or adopting, a practical construction
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1

by the parties, it is necessary and sufficient that
each party shall have placed the same construction on the contract. While the construction
placed by one party on his own language in a
contract is the highest evidence of his own intention, the meaning of the contract cannot be
established by the construction placed on it by
one of the parties, unless such interpretation
has been made to and relied on by the other
party, or has been known to and acquiesced in
by the other party, . . . "
Not only was the meaning placed upon the agreement by practical construction characterized by mutuality, but the benefits and burdens under the agreement were likewise of mutual import and duration. In
other words, this Court should favor a construction of
the agreement which would equalize the burdens and
benefits as intended by the parties. The consideration
conveyed by each party should be weighed against the
consideration conveyed or promised by the other party in
an attempt to arrive at a fair and equitable solution.
In this regard the prior opinion of this Court said
(R. 2-p. 2):
" . . . This right of access was to be exclusive
for the use of th~ Club and its members, except
that Annie C. Maw and her successor in interest
were obligated to keep a portion of this right-ofway in a travelable condition, for which service
the sons of Annie C. Maw named therein were
granted certain nonassessible shooting privileges, which privileges any such named son could
in any year designate a son of his own to enjoy
such privilege in his stead." (Emphasis added).
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It would be patently unfair to require the successors in interest of Anne C. J.Yiaw to carry the burden of
maintaining the road in a travelable conditions while
at the same time denying them of the correlative benefit
of using the Duck Club facilities for hunting wild fowl.
Furthermore, the consideration for the conveyance of
the right-of-way easement by Annie C. Maw was " .. .
$1.00 in hand paid and other valuable consideration .. .
and the matters herein recited, . .. ,, (Emphasis added)
(PL Exh. A). One matter therein recited was the
privilege of using the Duck Club facilities. Since the
right-of-way easement was not limited to the duration
of the lives of the sons of Annie C. Maw, the shooting
privileges should likewise not be so limited.
It is the contention of the appellants hereto that
they have a present and direct property interest under
the terms of the 1936 Right-of-,Vay Agreement. The
interest held by the appellants hereto is a vested interest
for which they should be compensated. Appellants only
ask that they be allowed to present their case to a jury
with the understanding that a valuation will be made
according to the stipulation of the parties as contained
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (R.
38).

POINT II
THE ISSUE AS TO 'VHETHER A THIRD·
PARTY BENEFICIARY AGREEMENT EX·
ISTED FOR THE BENEFIT OF PLAIN·
TIFFS SHOULD HA VE BEEN SUBMITTED
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TO THE JURY OR DECIDED AS A :MATTER
OF LA\V IN FAVOR OF SAID PLAINTIFFS.
It seems superfluous to discuss the existence of a
yalid and binding contract in favor of the appellants
hereto, since this Court has previously held that such
an agreement existed (R. 2-p.2). However, because of
the persistence of the respondent and the failure of
the district court to follow the prior opinion in this
matter, it becomes necessary to discuss briefly the
rationale behind appellants' third-party beneficiary
claim.

Nevertheless, before spelling out appellants' claim,
the appropriate language from the prior opinion of this
Court is quoted as follows (R. 2-pp. 2 & 3):
"The Court erred in dismissing the complaint
with prejudice against the Weber Basin Water
Conservancy District, for it is clear that in order
to avoid condemnation proceedings it agreed to
evaluate and pay for any shooting privileges if
the construction of the Dam caused their loss.
There can be no doubt that the activities in connection with the construction of the Dam did
cause such loss. Had not the purchase contract
with the United States Government been executed, it would have been necessary to institute
condemnation proceedings. In condemnation
proceedings the value of the "shooting privileges" would have been a proper element of
damages to be considered by a jury in determining the value of the land taken. The Water
Conservancy District merely agreed to do at a
later date what it would have been compelled
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to do sooner had the owners ref used to sell the
lands for the project." (Emphasis added).

During the trial of this matter Orlo Maw testified
that he refused to sign a land purchase contract on
behalf of \V. John .l\law and Sons, Inc., unless he
received written assurance from the \Veber Basin Water
Conservancy District that the rights of the members of
the J..VIaw family in the duck hunting privileges and the
duck club right-of-way were protected and preserved
or else compensated for (R. 39-pp. 7 & 10). Mr. Orlo :
.l\la w testified as follows concerning this written assurance which was introduced as Plaintiffs' Exhibit B
(R. 39-p.10):

Q. I show you what has been marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit B and I will ask you what it
is, 1\-Ir. Maw? (hands to witness).
A. This is a rough draft prepared by Mr. Skeen.

Q. And that's a rough draft of what?
A. Of the letter which I asked him to write pro·
tecting our interests if we signed the contract
with the United States Government, that
these rights would be appraised at a later
date.
Subsequent to the receipt of the rough draft, .Mr.
Maw received three executed originals and two executed
copies of the same letter (Pl. Exh. C), for distribution
to the interested members of the Maw family. The
letter was prepared by E. J. Skeen, attorney for the
Weber Basin District, and was signed by E. J. Fjeldsted, .Manager of the Weber Basin "\!Vater Conservancy
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....

I

I

District. Notwithstanding the reference in the letter
that the Land Purchase Contract had been executed,
the date of the letter antedates the signing of the Land
Purchase Contract by ten days. This is made clear by
the following testimony of Orio Maw (R. 39-pp. 11
& 13):
Q. I next show you what has been marked as
Plaintiff's Exhibit C which contains five separate items clipped together with a staple.
Could you tell us what these are? (hands to
witness)

A. These are letters prepared by Mr. E. J.
Skeen and signed by E. J. Fjeldsted for the
protection of our shooting privileges and
other rights which might have been damaged
or destroyed in the purchase of the land.
Q. And does the language of those letters substantially conform to the language of the
preceding exhibit?
A. I believe it's word for word.
Q. Now are all of those letters signed by Mr.
Fjeldstd?
A. They are.
Q. And approximately when did you receive
those letters ?
A. I would have received them before July 15th.
Q. And the letter itself is dated July what?

A. July 5th.

• • •

Q. I show you what has been marked Exhibit
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D and ask you to identify it and tell us what

it is? (hands to witness) .

A. This is a land purchase contract by the United
States Department of Interior, Bureau of
Reclamation, land purchased from W. John
lVIaw & Sons, Inc. And the contract was made
the 15th of July, 1957.
It is submitted that Orlo lVIaw, through John W.
lVIaw and Sons, Inc., created a binding and valid third.
party beneficiary contract in favor of the appellants
hereto, relating to the duck club shooting privileges.
The We her Ilasin Water Conservancy District received
the benefits of this agreement and acknowledged the
existence of the agreement in the following language
(Pl. Exh. C) :

"This letter will assure you that the land pur·
chase contract does not cover your other property interests in the Willard Bay Area, and spe·
cifically your state leases, water rights, easements, licenses, duck club shooting privileges,
or lands other than those described in the land
purchase contract. Any such property interests
which will be required in the construction of
the Dam or which will be damaged or destroyed
will be appraised at a later date and an offer
to purchase will be made."
The existence of this agreement for the benefit of
members of the Maw family was evidenced by the fact
that the duck club right-of-way was expressly reserved
from the Land Purchase Contract (Pl. Exh. D) which
was signed on July 15, 1957. Furthermore, the letter
from J. Stuart McMaster (Pl. Exh. F), dated Sep·
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tember 11, 1958, recognized the hunting privileges of
the .Maw people.
'fhe cases in Utah clearly recognize that one person
can make on behalf of another person a contract which
is enforceable by the beneficiary. The contract can be
founded upon a creditor or a donee relationship, so
long as the benefit is direct and not merely incidental.
This has been made clear in Kelly v. Richards, 95 Utah
560, 83 P. 2d. 731, 129 A.L.R. 164 (1938), where this
Court said:
"The rule of allowing the third party beneficiary to recover is recognized now in America
because it is reasonable and is not merely acceptable as a flat rule of law. It is just and expedient
to allow the person for whose benefit the contract
is made to enforce it against the person whose
duty is is to pay. However, an incidental beneficiary has no rights under the contract. Robins
Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U. S.
303 48 S. Ct. 134, 72 L ed 290 and German
Alliance Ins. Co. v. Homewater Supply Co.,
226 U. S. 220, 33 S. Ct. 32, 57 L ed 195, 42
LRA (NS) 1000, are to the effect that before
a third party can sue for. a breach of a contract
to which he was not a party he must show that
the contract was intended to benefit him directly.
The terms of the agreement and the facts and
circumstances that surround its making can be
examined to determine whether the supposed
beneficiary was in fact intended to be such, ... "

*

*

*

"A stranger may benefit by a contract if promises are made where the promise has no pecuniary
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interest in the performance of the contract, his
object being to enter into it for the benefit of
such stranger, or where the promisee seeks indirectly to discharge an obligation of his own
to the stranger by securing from the promisor
a promise to pay such person. Vol. 12, American
Jurisprudence, Contracts, Section 283."
That no privity is required between the promisee
and the third parties is made clear by the following language from Walker Bank & Trust Company v. First
Security Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 215, 341, P.2d 944,
945 (1959):
"It is often stated that privity of contract is
a prerequisite to holding one liable for breach
of a duty thereunder. But it is also recognized
that there are duties to others than the immediate
parties, where from the nature of the contract,
it is plainly evident to the promissor (sic) that
the contract is for the benefit of third persons
and that a failure to discharge his duty would
adversely affect them."

This Court has gone beyond the holding that no
privity need exist and has held that a third-party beneficiary contract is valid, binding and enforceable at the
instance and in the name of the beneficiary albeit made
without the knowledge of the beneficiary. Brown v.
Markland, 16 Utah 360, 52 Pac. 597 ( 1898). Further·
more where the beneficiaries are so described as to be
ascertainable, it is not necessary that they be named
in the contract in order to recover thereon. Smith v.
Bowman, 32 Utah 33, 88 Pac. 687 (1907); 17 Am.
Jur. 2d, Contracts, Sec. 313 (1964).
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It is elemental that the contract between the
promisee and promisor must possess the necessary
elements to make it a binding obligation to enable a
third person, for whose benefit the promise was made,
to sue upon it. More specifically, the contract must be
based upon consideration.

The consideration for the agreement benefitting
the appellants hereto was furnished by the signing of
the Land Purchase Contract by Orlo Maw, as president
of ,V. John Maw and Sons, Inc., and by his forbearance from necessitating a condemnation proceeding by
the "\Veber Basin Water Conservancy District. The
facts are undisputed that Orlo Maw would not have
signed the Land Purchase Contract, but would have
forced a condemnation action, but for the third-party
promise by respondent (R. 39-pp. 7, 13 & 14). This
Court so held in its prior opinion when, in reference to
the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District, it said
(R. 2-p. 2):
" . . . For it is clear that in order to avoid
condemnation proceedings it agreed to evaluate
and pay for any shooting privileges ... "
That this forbearance and signing constitutes sufficient
consideration is reinforced by the general rule from
17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts, Sec. ll6 (1964):
"Clearly f orebearance upon request to prosecute a well-founded claim is sufficient consideration for a promise. On the other hand, most
courts have reached the opposite conclusion with
regard to the question whether forbearance to
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sue on an unfounded claim will support a prom.
ise given therefor, either by the alleged debtor
or by a third person. It has been declared that
a promise in consideration of forbearance is not
binding if there was originally no right or cause
of action or if the claim threatened to be enforced
was invalid and worthless, groundless or unfounded, or not even doubtful, colorable, or
plausible, or if no claim was ever made or asserted . . . "
At this juncture it should be pointed out that,
even if some doubt could have existed as to whether
or not the lVIaws of the second generation, i.e., the
grandsons o fAnnie C. Maw, were entitled to the duck
club shooting privileges, that doubt was resolved and
a new contractual arrangement was entered into by
the Weber Basin Water Conservancy District in the
form of a third-party beneficiary contract. This is so
because W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., gave up its
rights to litigate the matter of compensation in a com!
of law in exchange for the recognition and protection
of the duck shooting privileges in the Ogden Duck
Club. Although appellants certainly do not concede
that the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement would not
extend to and benefit the grandsons of Annie C. Maw,
they do feel that a valid and binding third-party beneficiary contract exists in favor of the said grandsons
as further support for their claim to recover.
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POINT III
APPELLANTS ARE ENTITLED TO RECOVER PUNITIVE DAMAGES AGAINST
THE WEBER BASIN WATER CONSERVANCY DISTRICT BECAUSE OF THE LATTER'S FRAUDULENT, UNLAWFUL AND
MALICIOUS TRESPASS UPON, AND DESTRUCTION OF, THEIR PR 0 PERT Y
RIGHTS.
At the final Pre-Trial hearing, on November 21,
1966, the district court announced its decision and
ruling that the prayer for punitive damages set forth
in plaintiffs' Amended Complaint would be stricken
and over-ruled (R. 28-p. l). This action of the district
court was taken prior to the introduction of any testimony regarding plaintiffs' claim to punitive damages.
The action taken by the lower court is also herein contended to be an invasion of the province of the jury.
This Court has ruled on more than one occasion
that the amount of punitive damages which can justly
and properly be awarded and whether such damages
should be awarded are properly matters for the sound
discretion of the jury. Evans v. Gaisford, 122 Utah 156
247 P. 2d 43 (1952); Wilson v. Oldroyd, l Utah 2d
362, 267 P. 2d 759 (1954); Po:-vers v. Taylor, 14 Utah
2d 152, 379 P.2d 380 (1963). In the Wi"lson case this
court said on page 766:
"Just as with compensatory damages, it is
peculiarly within the province of the jury to de-
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termine whether exemplary damages should ht
awarded."
The judge obviously has some discretion in submitting
the prayer for punitive damages to the jury; however
it is submitted that on the facts of this case there exists
sufficient basis and reason for the assessment of puni.
tive or exemplary damages. A look at the relevant facts
will make this evident.

On the 7th day of April, 1958, the Ogden Duck
Club executed a Quit Claim Deed showing W. John
Maw and Sons, Inc., and Grace B. Maw as the grantee1
(Eubank deposition p. 51). The Quit Claim Deed.
which was Plaintiffs' Exhibit B under the offer of
proof in the prior appeal, described all of the land
which had previously been transferred under W arrant1·
Deed (PL Exh. E) from W. John Maw and Sons,
Inc., and Grace B. Maw to the United States of
America, inclu,ding the right-of-way to the duck club
facilities which had been conveyed to the Ogden Duck
Club in the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement.
All of this appears rather innocuous until additional
facts are known. First, the Warranty Deed was absolutt
on its face, containing no reservation for the duck clul
right-of-way. Second, the existence of the right-of-wa~
in the duck club was necessary for the continuation o
the appellants' shooting rights, or, as said by this Cour
in its prior opinion, " . . . the right-of-way was th
subject matter of the agreement upon which appellant
shooting privileges depended, ... " (R. 2-p. 2). Thir1
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the Quit Claim Deed was executed and recorded without
tlzc knowledge of the grantee, and without having been
dclirered to, or accepted by, the grantee (Eubank Deposition p. 59) .

A further look at the deposition of .Mr. Eubank,
Ogden Duck Club Secretary, gives the ostensible reason
for the execution and recording of the Quit Claim Deed.
Q. What was the occasion for this deed being

prepared? In other words, how did it come
about that this became necessary, do you
know?

A. 'V ell, I understood it was to clear the title
to that ground out there so the Maws could
get the settlement. That's all I know.
Q. 'Vho prepared the document, do you know?
A. I assume the Weber Basin Conservancy District did. I don't recall where it came from.
I don't know where it came from, to be honest with you.
MR. SKEEN: It was prepared by the Bureau of Reclamation.
{Eubank deposition p. 55)

J
1

As to the information apparently received by Mr.
Eubank to the effect that the Quit Claim Deed had
to be secured so that the Maws could get their payment
for the lands involved, someone apparently seriously
misinformed Mr. Eubank since the Quit Claim Deed
issued by the Ogden Duck Club was dated April 7,
1958, almost one year after the Land Purchase Contract of July 15, 1957. The someone who misinformed
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~Ir. Enbank was undoubtedly one of those same pers 0ib
who prepared or recorded the particular deed. It
submitted that the respondent hereto was the real parh
in securing the execution of the deed. In fact, the Qu;t ·
Claim Deed was recorded at the request of 'Villia1L
1
H. \Vikox, who was at that time an employee of thq
\.Veber Basin \Vater Conservancy District.
'
,
1

I

A closer look at the deposition of Mr. Eubanl[
gives the real reason for the execution of the Quit Clain:i
D~d.
I

I

A. No, we don't feel we have had anything in.I
volve? in i~, a~d we felt that by the issuance!
of this qmtcla1m deed to the Maws whicl1
covered all of that country out there, thatj
it certainly abrogated anything that we would I
have in connection with the lane which m
couldn't use anyway because it had been
closed off by the Government. \:Ve couldn't
get across it. We couldn't get through it. We
couldn't go across the ditch. We had to go
around on the Government road. \.Ve did
feel, and do feel to this date, by the execution
of this quitclaim deed which was executed
by the Club which made it possible for the
.Maws to obtain their settlement from the
United States Government on all their prop·
erty that they had out there, that it abrogated
anything that we had.
(Eubank deposition-p. 54'

1

As can be seen, the Weber Basin Water Con·
servancy District sought to destroy the shooting privi·
leges of the members of the Maw family by itself
executing and recording the Quit Claim Deed because
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knew full well that the Maws would not accept or
record the deed which was in derogation of their shooting privileges. In so acting to destroy the property
interests of the Maws, the Weber Basin District relied
upon the doctrine of after-acquired title, or estoppel
by deed. That doctrine was relied upon since Grace
B, Maw and W. John Maw and Sons, Inc., had preriously executed and delivered to the United States a
\V arranty Deed (PL Exh. E) which described the
same property as that described in the Quit Claim
Deed, including the duck club right-of-way area upon
which appellants' shooting privileges depended. If the
Weber Basin District had not had the deprivation of
the appellants' shooting priviliges in mind, it could have
had the deed executed directly to the respondent or
to the United States of America.
jt

It is the contention of the appellants that the
obtaining of the Quit Claim Deed from the Ogden
Duck Club and the recording of same, without the
knowledge of the appellants or W. John Maw and Sons,
Inc., and Grace B. Maw, is unlawful, fraudulent and
malicious. Such are hardly the actions of a part.y acting
in good faith and in the honest belief that its acts are
lawful. Bear in mind that these acts were instigated
by attorneys who should know the requirements of
delivery and acceptap.ce. Any effort to circumvent
these requirements at the expense of the grantee
amounts to nothing less than a fraud.
It is inconceivable that the respondent acted in
good faith or in an honest belief as to the lawfulness of
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its acts so as to come within the language of Calho
v. Universal Credit Co., 106 Utah 166, 146 P. 2d 28J
288 (1944), where this Court said:
11

"The party must know that the act is wrongf
and must do it intentionally without just ca~ 1.
or excuse. If he acts in good faith and in th
honest belief that his act is lawful, he is no
liable for punitive damages even though he ma1
be mistaken as to the legality of his act."
·
11

Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the respondem
could appropriate the property rights of the appellanti
and effectuate a continuing trespass without realizini
that it was acting without the law. This trespass ha1
continued without compensation despite the prior man·
date of this Court that '' . . . ( t) here can be no doub!
that the activities in connection with the construcfo
of the Dam did cause such loss" ( R. 2-p. 3). The
appellants have suffered an actual loss because of the
respondent's taking of their property rights withoul
the exercise by the respondent of its power of eminenl
domain.

At this juncture it should be made clear that th~
lawsuit involves more than a determination of the re·
spective rights of the parties under the third-par~·
beneficiary contract. This lawsuit is also an inverse
condemnation action to obtain just compensation for
the property rights taken by the respondent. This
lawsuit has been made necessary by the respondent')
failure to exercise its power of eminent domain If
acqmrmg the property rights of the appellants.
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Utah and the
'.: appellate courts of other states have held that punitive
damages are appropriate in actions on contracts and
I
d
.
.
· in inverse con emnahon actions.
1

The general rule with regard to the allowance of
punitive damages in actions for breach of contract is
~· given in 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Darnages, Sec. 245 (1965):
"As a general rule, damages for breach of
contract are limited to the pecuniary loss sustained. That is to say, exemplary damages are
not ordinarily or as a rule, recoverable in actions
for breach of contract. This rule does not obtain,
however, in those exceptional cases where the
breach amounts to an independent, wilful tort,
in which event exemplary damages ipay be recovered under proper allegations of malice,
wantonness, or oppression . . . "
1

It cannot be gainsaid that a trespass is not an independent tort, and it cannot be denied that the respondent has trespassed upon and destroyed the property
rights of the respondents. With regard to punitive
damages for trespass and as to the irrelevance of the
characterization of the wrongful act, this Court has
spoken in Powers v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d 152, 155, 379
P. 2d 380 (1963):

"It is true that punitive damages are usually
associated with other types of tortious injury.
But under proper circumstances they may be
allowed in cases of trespass. Whether such damages are awardab1e is not dependent upon the
classification of the wrongful act, nor upon the
nature of the injury, but upon the manner and
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intent with which it is done. If the wrongful a
by whic~ _one injuries another is ~one wilft1J;
and mahc10usly our law allows the imposition t
punitive damages as a punishment to the lk
fen<lant for such conduct and as a warning:
'
him and others against it."
The Powers case involved an action for damagt,I
caused by the repeated trespass of defendant's horstli
The plaintiff recovered $1,000 compensatory damage,ll
and $1,500 exemplary damages.
:
I

In another Utah case this Court allowed punitir,I
damages for the destruction of a property right. Tm
occurred in Falkenburg v. Neff, 72 Utah 258, 269 Par
1008 ( 1928), where the defendant destroyed a dallij
which plaintiff had built to divert water. It is interest.I
ing to note of the Falkenburg case that the defendarn\
had a prior application for appropriation of the wate\
involved, but had no immediate use for such water. Tht:
Falkenburg case follows explicitly the general rule a1i,
stated in 22 Am. Jur. 2d, Damages, Sec. 243 (1965) I
1

1

"Thus, where such circumstances or ingred1·I
ents are properly established as a predicate fnri
the award of exemplary damages, such damage
may be recoverable in actions for personal ir"
juries received in consequence of tortious acts.'
in actioM for in.Juries to, or for the wrongfu:'
tald,ng or destruction of property, ... " (Em·!
phasis added) .
1 ,

In the case at bar the respondent has wrongfulh
taken and destroyed the property interests of the appei·
lants. The respondent's failure to take this proper~
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1 under its power of eminent domain as this Court said
L would be necessary, has necessitated this inverse con,,. demnation action by the respondents.

~·

1'

No case has been found where the general rule has
been laid down that punitive damages are inappropriate
to inverse condemnation actions. The denial of punitive
~ damages in those inverse condemnation cases found
1
by this writer, where such damages were sought, has
been based upon the failure of the plaintiff to plead
or establish some requisite or ingredient. In Bridges
v. Ala.ska Housing Authority, 375 P. 2d 696 (Alaska
1962), the plaintiff was denied exemplary damages
i in an inverse condemnation case because he had not
~,I established wilful, outrageous, wanton, malicious or
reekless conduct. Similarly, in Southwestern Gas &
Electric Co. v. Patterson, 20 S.W. 2d 636 (Ark. 1929),
no showing of bad faith could be made since the condemning agency acted under a void order. In Van
11
Leuven v. Akers Motor Lines, Inc., 135 S. E. 2d 640
/ (N. C., 1964), the plaintiff failed to disclose a factual
1 basis for punitive damages in his pleadings.
I

: 1

I

I

However, the courts have clearly recognized the
: right to recover punitive damages in inverse condemnation cases. In Pittsburgh, C., C. & St. L. R. Co. v.
Sedwick, 124 N. E. 512 (Ind. 1919), the Supreme
i
Court of Indiana allowed punitive damages against
a railroad because it continued in possession after the
expiration of a lease and refused to vacate the premises
of the plaintiff even after an injunction had been issued.
The court said on page 514 :

1
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"The court has no hesitation in saying th,
such conduct was reprehensible, and, if tlii
amount recovered should contain an element :J'
exemplary damages, appellant may not con1 ,
plain. Thereby appellant became a trespasser:
occupying said real estate wholly without rig!ri
and continued as such until the time of the trw:
and even yet so continues. There could be rn
lawful appropriation of such real estate whi!,:
appellant so occupied it as a trespasser, and.\
as appears both by the pleadings and the eni
dence, no lawful steps were taken for the pur\·
pose of appropriating said real estate."
.
1
1

1

I
I

In Rider v. York Haven Water & Power Company, 255 Pa. 196, 199, 99 Atl. 798 (1916), a riparia11i
owner brought an inverse condemnation action for
damages on account of the diversion of water from it,
natural channel. In affirming the trial court in ill
award of punitive damages, the Supreme Court ol
Pennsylvania said:

"The conduct of defendant, including con·
structing and maintaining the dam across the
river without claim or semblance of authority.
the disclaiming in the equity suit any intention ·
of appropriating the water by right of eminent,
domain and the neglect to remove such dam fa:
several months after this court had affirmed the
decree ordering its removal, tended to show n i
careless and reckless disregard of plaintiffs !
rights and made the question of punitive dam· ·
ages one proper for the consideration of the
jury, and the amount allowed as such was not
out of proportion to the actual damages."
These latter two cases have a striking resemblance
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to the case at bar. In this case respondent has, during
the last six years, directed a steady stream of motions
:il the lower court, aimed against submitting this matter
to a trial on the merits where all of the evidence could
be introduced and weighed. Even though the Supreme
Court of the State of Utah has once ruled on this
matter, the respondent has taken up the same procedure where it left off before the appeal, with even
Jreatcr persistence and diligence. Its efforts to appropriate the duck shooting rights of the appellants without exercising. its power of eminent domain stand out
remarkably. Likewise, its qisregard of, and its refusal
to consider, the prior opinion of this Court cannot be
condoned.
Taken as a whole the acts and conduct of the
respondent evidence a conscious disregard of the rights
of the appellants and a reckless indifference to consequence. This conduct on the part of the respondent
is sufficient to warrant the introduction before a Jury
of evidence regarding punitive damages.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that the interpretative issue as to whether the 1936 Right-of-Way Agreement extended beyond the deaths of the four sons of
Annie C. Maw, and the issue as to whether a thirdparty beneficiary agreement was formed for the benefit
of plaintiffs, should have been submitted to the jury
or decided as a matter of law in favor of said plain45

tiffs. This action sought by the plaintiffs anu ap_pc11o.~'
is called for by the evidence adduced at trial and 111
the prior opinion of this Court. Furthermore, the ac:
and conduct of the respondents have been characterizer'
by fraud and a reckless indifference to the interests i
others so as to warrant the imposition of exemp!a 11
damages.
I
f

Respectfully submitted,
GLEN E. FULLER and
ORVAL C. HARRISOX .
Attorneys for PlaintiffsAppellants
15 East 4th South

Salt Lake City, Utah
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APPENDIX
(i)
RIGHT-OF-WAY AGREEMENT
THIS AGREE1\1ENT made between ANNIE
C. l\IA of Plain City, Weber County, Utah, Gran tor,
and OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Utah corporation, and
its members, Grantees.

'"T

WITNESSETH:

'Vhereas, Grantor is owner of lands m Sections
, 20-17-18, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt Lake
jferidian, as now appears of record in the offices of
I the County Recorders of Weber and Box Elder Counties, State of Utah; and

I

1

'Vhereas, Grantees and their predecessors in
interest are now, and have been, using said lands for
many years for right-of-way purposes;
Now therefore, in consideration of $1.00 in hand
paid and other valuable consideration, receipt of which
is hereby acknowledged and the matters herein recited,
Grantor does hereby give and grant unto Grantees and
their successors in interest a convenient right-of-way

over and across said lands for the purpose of going ti:
and from the Club House owned by Grantees in Section 12, Township 7 North, Range 3 'Vest, Salt Lah
.Meridian, and the shooting grounds of Grantee lyillu
North of the above described lands and other lanu 1
now owned by Grantor, and to construct and maintaii.:
a ditch, or ditches, at expense of Grantees, in said Section 18, Township 7 North, Range 2 \Vest, Salt Lakt I
:Meridian, for the purpose of conducting water thereon,·
over, and to said Club House and grounds of said
Grantees. This grant shall be exclusive to Grantees a.,
to the purposes herein expressed except as to Grantor
and the members of her family hereinafter mentioned .:
so long as Grantees and any successors shall maintain :.
said Club House and shooting grounds for the purpose '
of shooting wild fowl.
1

In consideration of non-assessable shooting pririleges on said shooting grounds of Grantees on days '.
excepting the opening day, Saturdays, Sundays, and j
holidays, to be enjoyed by, and hereby granted to. ,
the sons of Gran tor named as follows, to-wit:
'
'Vilmer J. :Maw, Rufus J. Maw, Gilbert Maw, and:
George Maw, Grantor agrees to maintain in a travel·
able condition the road which is a part of the right-ofway herein granted to Grantees, now existing in said
Section 20, Township 7 North, Range 2 West, Salt
Lake :Meridian along the North rod of the East half
of said section; provided that in any year the said
'Vilmer J. l\'.Iaw, Rufus Maw, Gilbert l\iaw, and George
11

\law may designate one son for each thereof to shoot

:iud enjoy the privileges hereunder in place of such
son's father; but it is expressly understood that blinds
1111 the shooting grounds of Grantees being used at any
time by said sons shall be given up to members of the
Ogden Duck Club upon request.
In consideration of the feed and grazing benefits
to be enjoyed and hereby granted by the Ogden Duck
Club to Grantor or her successors on lands controlled
by said Ogden Duck Club and its successors in the
ricinity of lands owned by Grantor, Grantor agrees to
back up all surplus water of the two creeks running
through lands of the Grantor above the present dam
located on the North side of the Northeast quarter of
said Section 20, and to turn water loose through said
dam at the pleasure of Grantees.
This agreement shall be binding upon the heirs
and assigns of the Grantor and the successors and
assigns of the Grantees.
Annie C. Maw
Grantor
OGDEN DUCK CLUB, a Corporation
Grantee
By: A. W. Hestmark
President
By: W. H. Reeder Jr.
Secretary
(Acknowledgment omitted).
lll

